Slides 03: Fund Classification and Style Drift

Institutional Investors

Calvin J. Chiou (邱健嘉)

Department of Finance · National Chengchi University

2026-10-22

Before Any Regression

Today’s question

Every mutual fund paper starts with a sentence like: “Our sample consists of actively managed U.S. domestic equity funds.”

Three decisions hide inside that sentence:

  1. Which rows are funds? — share classes, incubation, tiny funds
  2. Which funds are “active domestic equity”? — classification recipes
  3. Does a fund stay the same kind of fund? — style and style drift

Today’s empirical anchor for (3): Chan et al. (2002), Review of Financial Studies.

Plan for the hour

The full code for every step is in the Lecture 3 handout.
Part Topic Minutes
1 Cleaning the CRSP sample: units, filters, incubation 12
2 Classifying funds: active, index, ETF 13
3 Style drift: Chan et al. (2002) 25
— Takeaways and discussion 5

Part 1 · Cleaning the Sample

A “fund” in CRSP is not one row

Identifier Level Use
crsp_fundno Share class Fees, loads, TNA differ by class
crsp_cl_grp Class group CRSP’s grouping of a fund’s classes
crsp_portno Portfolio Links to holdings; not always populated
wficn Fund MFLINKS link to Thomson Reuters holdings

A fund with four share classes counted as four funds is four votes in every cross-section and every skill test.

Fix (Doshi et al. 2015; Back et al. 2018; Dannhauser and Pontiff 2026): aggregate to the fund. Sum TNA; age = oldest class; fees and other characteristics TNA-weighted.

Why each filter exists

Filters in the three papers we follow
Filter Typical rule Bias it removes
Incubation Drop first 18 months (Doshi et al. 2015) to 3 years (Dannhauser and Pontiff 2026) Backfilled private track records (Evans 2010)
Small funds TNA < $15 million Noisy, upward-biased small-fund returns (Elton et al. 2001)
Equity share ≥ 80% in equity (Kacperczyk et al. 2008) Codes ≠ what the fund holds
Holdings > 10 stocks Holdings measures meaningless
Mandate Drop target-date (Parker et al. 2023), ETNs, leveraged/inverse Not comparable products

Filters are not housekeeping. Each one is an identification assumption about which funds belong in the population.

Incubation: how zero skill becomes “skill”

A family seeds several funds privately, then opens only the winners to the public; the private record is backfilled (Evans 2010).

Incubated funds’ alpha: 1.7% per year with the backfilled record, 0.2% after dropping the first 36 months.

The window is a design choice

  • Doshi et al. (2015): drop the first 18 months
  • Back et al. (2018): use returns only after the first offer date and once the fund name appears
  • Dannhauser and Pontiff (2026): drop the first 3 years — also removes the burst of sentiment-driven ETF launches (Ben-David et al. 2023)

Longer window → safer filter, fewer young funds. Report it, and show robustness to it.

Part 2 · Classifying Funds

Why classification is not a detail

Dannhauser and Pontiff (2026), domestic-equity fund assets, 2005 → 2022:

Vehicle Start End
Active mutual funds > 82% 43%
Index mutual funds 11% 24%
ETFs 7% 33%

“Equity funds” today means three vehicles. Pool them without labels and you mix mandates; pool index funds into a skill test and you dilute the tails (Lecture 2).

Three published recipes

Same raw data, three populations
Doshi et al. (2015) Back et al. (2018) Dannhauser and Pontiff (2026)
Core rule Any of four vendor codes on a diversified-equity list CRSP objective ED + C/Y CRSP ED… or Lipper list incl. sectors
Drops Int’l, balanced, sector, index Hedged/short (YH/YS), option income, index, TDF Foreign names, ETNs, leveraged, FoF, active ETFs, TDF
Passive / ETFs Dropped Dropped Kept and labeled
Goal Clean active sample Clean active sample Comparable sample of all vehicles

Where the recipes disagree

In the handout’s simulation (where the true type of every fund is known), the recipes agree on core broad active funds and differ at the edges:

  • Vendor codes (Doshi et al. 2015) let in hedged, short, and option-income funds and some target-date funds
  • CRSP code + index flag (Back et al. 2018) lets in index funds whose CRSP index flag is missing (it starts late)
  • Domestic-equity universe (Dannhauser and Pontiff 2026) adds sector funds by design and strips passive products

Choosing a recipe is choosing a population. Re-run your main result under a second recipe.

Names are data — dirty data

Fund name (fictional) Truth Substring rule Whole-word rule
Alder Total Stock Indx Fund Index Index Index
Granite Growth Fund RSP Active Index —
Alder Wind Energy Fund Active Index —
Beacon Select 100 Opportunities Fund Active Index —
Delta Russell 2000 Alpha Fund Active Index Index

SP sits inside “RSP”, ind inside “Wind”, “100” in a fund name. Whole words fix some errors, not all (“Russell 2000 Alpha”). Published papers hand-check what their rules flag; Dannhauser and Pontiff (2026) report a false positive in their own data.

Part 3 · Style and Style Drift

Three ways to know a fund’s style

Approach Source Weakness
Stated Prospectus objective; Lipper / Morningstar / CRSP codes It is what the fund chooses to say (Kim et al. 2000; Cooper et al. 2005)
Returns-based Factor loadings; Sharpe (1992) style weights Needs a long window; lags
Holdings-based Size, B/M, momentum of stocks held (Daniel et al. 1997) Needs holdings; quarterly snapshots

Style drift = the style moves over time. Two sources: the manager trades into a new style (active), or the stocks migrate while held (passive) (Wermers 2012).

Why researchers care about drift

  • Benchmarks. A “growth” fund holding value stocks earns an alpha that is a style bet (Lecture 1)
  • Investors’ portfolios. A growth + value mix only diversifies if each fund stays what it is
  • Agency. A manager behind in the race may change strategy to catch up (Brown et al. 1996; Chevalier and Ellison 1997) — drift is one way to do it
  • Sample selection. A paper on “growth funds” studies whatever the label contains

The source paper

Chan et al. (2002) — “On Mutual Fund Investment Styles”, RFS 15(5)

Data

  • Morningstar: monthly returns 1976–1997, holdings from 1983
  • 3,336 U.S. domestic equity funds alive at end-1997
  • Defunct funds only from 1989 → early years are survivor-biased

Two style measures

  • Characteristics: rank every stock 0–1 on size, B/M, past return; a fund’s score = holdings-weighted average rank
  • Loadings: Fama-French three-factor loadings over the past 36 months, ranked 0–1

Four questions: Where do funds sit? Do styles persist? Who changes style? Does style-adjusted performance differ?

Finding 1 · Funds hug the market

Holdings-weighted style scores (0 = lowest stock rank, 1 = highest), CCL Table 4:

Fund average S&P 500
Size score 0.94 0.98
Book-to-market score 0.35 0.38
Past 3-year return score 0.63 0.63
  • About 26% of funds sit in the smallest size decile, but they hold only ~11% of fund assets
  • 60% of funds (67% of assets) fall in B/M deciles 3–5; only 3.2% sit in the three most “value” deciles
  • When funds deviate from the market, they lean toward growth and past winners

Finding 2 · Styles persist, but not tightly

Correlation between a fund’s style rank (FF3 loadings) over the past 3 years and over the non-overlapping 3 years after, year-ends 1984–1994 (CCL Table 3):

Correlations of 0.7–0.9, yet the average absolute change in rank is 0.11–0.18 — a fund moves more than a decile, on average, every three years.

Finding 3 · Losers change style

Sort funds on past two-year return (winners = top 20%, losers = bottom 20%) and on style (top / middle / bottom 30%); measure the absolute change in B/M rank (CCL Section 5.2, Table 8).

Losing value funds drift twice as far as winning ones — and toward growth (B/M rank 0.648 → 0.572). Losing growth funds stay put (0.146 → 0.171).

Is that drift active? A quick argument

A value fund that lost money holds stocks whose prices fell → their B/M ratios rose.

Passive migration alone would push a losing value fund further toward value.

CCL find losing value funds move toward growth — against the passive channel. For holdings characteristics, that points to trading, consistent with a manager abandoning a style that has not paid off.

(This is our reading of the result, not a test in the paper. Holdings changes are what separate active from passive drift (Wermers 2012).)

Finding 4 · Style-adjusted performance

Equal-weighted alphas of size × B/M fund groups (CCL Table 6 and conclusion):

  • Growth minus value: about 0.143% per month (≈ 1.7% per year) under three factors
  • About 1.2% per year after adding momentum
  • Concentrated in small-cap funds: 2.82% per year four-factor gap

The authors call this “some evidence.” The difference itself carries no reported standard error, and the sample conditions on survival to 1997.

Finding 5 · Which style measure predicts better?

For the funds where the two measures disagree most (one says value, the other says growth), CCL predict returns in extreme-HML months (Table 9):

Mean absolute prediction error (lower is better)
Disagreement Months Characteristics Loadings
Value by chars, growth by loadings Lowest HML 1.395 1.702
Highest HML 1.480 1.766
Growth by chars, value by loadings Lowest HML 1.367 1.640
Highest HML 1.490 2.076

Holdings characteristics win in all four cases: they see the current portfolio; loadings see the last 36 months.

Why loadings lag: a fund we control

A simulated fund holds 70% large growth + 30% small growth, then switches entirely to value at month 121. Rolling 36-month Sharpe weights:

The estimate crosses 50% only 17 months after the switch. Short windows react faster but are noisier — the core trade-off in every returns-based drift measure.

A referee’s view of CCL (2002)

  • Survivorship. The sample is funds alive at end-1997. Losers that survived may be precisely those that changed style — drift and survival are jointly selected
  • Mean reversion and a mechanical gap. Estimated extreme ranks revert, and past returns depend on true style, so losers and winners differ in how noisy their ranks are. In a simulation with no drift, value losers still move ~0.016 more than value winners (handout §6.3) — the null is not zero
  • No inference on the key contrasts. Table 8 and the growth–value alpha gap are descriptive sorts
  • Drift ≠ decision. Rank changes mix trading, stock migration, and estimation error; separating them needs holdings and trades

Wrapping Up

Key takeaways

  • The sample is the first model. Each filter removes a documented bias; skipping incubation turns zero skill into apparent skill
  • Share classes are not funds. Aggregate to WFICN before counting, aging, or averaging fees
  • Three recipes, three populations. They agree on the core and disagree at the edges; report robustness to a second recipe
  • Styles cluster near the market and persist imperfectly (Chan et al. 2002)
  • Losers drift, especially value losers moving toward growth
  • Holdings beat loadings for measuring current style; loadings lag by construction

Discussion questions

  1. Survivorship: how would you redo CCL’s Table 8 with the CRSP survivor-bias-free database? What result would change your conclusion?
  2. Design a test that separates active drift (trading) from passive drift (stock migration) for a value fund that lost money.
  3. A fund keeps its “growth” label while its returns load like a value fund. Why might the manager leave the label unchanged? How would that bias a study of fund flows?

Coming up

Next lab: run the Lecture 3 handout end to end — the filter pipeline, the three recipes, and rolling style weights for real funds (FCNTX, VWNDX).

Next week: benchmarks and Active Share (Cremers and Petajisto 2009; Petajisto 2013) — now that we know which funds we study and what style they really follow.

References

Back, Kerry, Alan D. Crane, and Kevin Crotty. 2018. “Skewness Consequences of Seeking Alpha.” Review of Financial Studies 31 (12): 4720–61. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy029.
Ben-David, Itzhak, Francesco Franzoni, Byungwook Kim, and Rabih Moussawi. 2023. “Competition for Attention in the ETF Space.” Review of Financial Studies 36 (3): 987–1042.
Brown, Keith C., W. V. Harlow, and Laura T. Starks. 1996. “Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry.” Journal of Finance 51 (1): 85–110. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05203.x.
Chan, Louis K. C., Hsiu-Lang Chen, and Josef Lakonishok. 2002. “On Mutual Fund Investment Styles.” Review of Financial Studies 15 (5): 1407–37.
Chevalier, Judith, and Glenn Ellison. 1997. “Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives.” Journal of Political Economy 105 (6): 1167–200. https://doi.org/10.1086/516389.
Cooper, Michael J., Huseyin Gulen, and P. Raghavendra Rau. 2005. “Changing Names with Style: Mutual Fund Name Changes and Their Effects on Fund Flows.” Journal of Finance 60 (6): 2825–58.
Cremers, K. J. Martijn, and Antti Petajisto. 2009. “How Active Is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure That Predicts Performance.” Review of Financial Studies 22 (9): 3329–65. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp057.
Daniel, Kent, Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, and Russ Wermers. 1997. “Measuring Mutual Fund Performance with Characteristic-Based Benchmarks.” Journal of Finance 52 (3): 1035–58.
Dannhauser, Caitlin, and Jeffrey Pontiff. 2026. “Flow.” Review of Financial Studies, ahead of print. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhag080.
Doshi, Hitesh, Redouane Elkamhi, and Mikhail Simutin. 2015. “Managerial Activeness and Mutual Fund Performance.” Review of Asset Pricing Studies 5 (2): 156–84. https://doi.org/10.1093/rapstu/rav005.
Elton, Edwin J., Martin J. Gruber, and Christopher R. Blake. 2001. “A First Look at the Accuracy of the CRSP Mutual Fund Database and a Comparison of the CRSP and Morningstar Mutual Fund Databases.” Journal of Finance 56 (6): 2415–30.
Evans, Richard B. 2010. “Mutual Fund Incubation.” Journal of Finance 65 (4): 1581–611. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01579.x.
Kacperczyk, Marcin, Clemens Sialm, and Lu Zheng. 2008. “Unobserved Actions of Mutual Funds.” Review of Financial Studies 21 (6): 2379–416.
Kim, Mina, Ravi Shukla, and Michael Tomas. 2000. “Mutual Fund Objective Misclassification.” Journal of Economics and Business 52 (4): 309–23.
Parker, Jonathan A., Antoinette Schoar, and Yang Sun. 2023. “Retail Financial Innovation and Stock Market Dynamics: The Case of Target Date Funds.” Journal of Finance 78 (5): 2673–723.
Petajisto, Antti. 2013. “Active Share and Mutual Fund Performance.” Financial Analysts Journal 69 (4): 73–93. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v69.n4.7.
Sharpe, William F. 1992. “Asset Allocation: Management Style and Performance Measurement.” Journal of Portfolio Management 18 (2): 7–19. https://doi.org/10.3905/jpm.1992.409394.
Wermers, Russ. 2012. “Matter of Style: The Causes and Consequences of Style Drift in Institutional Portfolios.” Unpublished manuscript.



Questions?


Calvin J. Chiou
jjchiou@nccu.edu.tw
Office: Commerce Building 261233


See you next Thursday.